Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta autopoiesis. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta autopoiesis. Mostrar todas las entradas

miércoles, enero 07, 2009

Origen de las especies por medio de la deriva natural

Así es: Al fin disponible, en PDF y en su idioma original, la original propuesta de Maturana y Mpodozis sobre la evolución de los seres vivos, publicada en 1992. Conviene leerlo en su idioma original. La versión en inglés disponible en la Revista Chilena de Historia Natural no sólo sufre de las dificultades de la traducción sino que además refleja las intervenciones majaderas de algunos revisores (tales como la reiterada  exigencia de describirse como tautológica, que no agrega realmente nada a la comprensión del texto) 
¡Provecho!

lunes, agosto 04, 2008

Fisiologia (Cardíaca) Desenvolvimental II

O artigo citado por Gustavo em um post anterior mostrava um elegante experimento de Waddingon. Waddinton sacou o coração de embriões de galinha em um estágio em que estes eram capazes de sobreviver e se desenvolver sem a o coração. Uma das consequências morfogenéticas da ausência do coração foi a perda do dobramento cefálico característico de aminiotas. O artigo de Waddington foi citado, surpreendentemente, apenas dez vezes. Uma das citações - "Correlation between the embryonic head flexures and cardiac development (1993)"- de Manner et al., fez o experimento ao revés. Impediu o dobramento da cabeça colocando um pêlo dentro do tubo neural (Figuras 1 e 2). O resultado: mal formação cardíaca.

The aim of the present study is to examine whether the formation of the cranial and cervical flexures is involved in the process of cardiac looping, and whether looping anomalies are causally involved in the development of cardiac malformations. For this purpose, the formation of the cranial and cervical flexures was experimentally suppressed in chick embryos by introducing a straight human hair into the neural tube. In the experimental embryos, the absence of the cervical flexure, alone or in combination with a reduced cranial flexure, was always associated with anomalies in the looping of the tubular heart.





Os autores, intrigados, discutem:

These results are in accord with the hypothesis that certain positional and morphological changes of the embryonic heart loop are caused by the formation of the head flexures (His 1881 ; Patten 1922). However, we must concede that there are experimental findings published by Waddington (1937) and Flynn et al. (1991) which seemingly support a totally different hypothesis, namely that the curvature of the cervical region is caused by the positional changes of the heart loop. Our results do not give direct information as to which of the two correlated processes - embryonic flexures and cardiac looping - is the cause and which is the effect.

A dúvida dos autores surge desde um ponto de vista mecanicista dos seres vivos. No entanto, o coração contribui para a dobramento da cabeça e o dobramento da cabeça contribui para a formação do coração. Organismos possuem uma organização circular que os diferencia de máquinas. Como diria um velho filósofo alemão: "Organismos são seres em que as partes são meio e fim". Ou:


martes, julio 22, 2008

What is so informative about information?

What is so informative about information?
Carlos M. Hamame, Diego Cosmelli, and Francisco Aboitiz (2007) . Comentario sobre: "Précis of Evolution in Four Dimensions" Eva Jablonka and Marion J lamb
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 371 – 372

Abstract: Understanding evolution beyond a gene-centered vision is a fertile ground for new questions and approaches. However, in this systemic perspective, we take issue with the necessity of the concept of information. Through the example of brain and language evolution, we propose the autonomous systems theory as a more biologically relevant framework for the evolutionary perspective offered by Jablonka & Lamb

Hablando del tremendo daño a Chile con que según Medel (2008) carga el legado de Maturana, ya mencionaba anteriormente que por aquel fatídico templo de endoctrinamiento que era el lab "el rayo" había pasado Francisco Aboitiz. Ahora, entiéndase bien: Aboitiz tiene "ADN" darwinista. Al menos donde quedamos la última vez, la cuestión era la selección natural, y le molestaba el manejo de M&M de ese tema.

En realidad, pasar por el lab de Maturana no es un lavado de cerebro. Cada cual termina recogiendo lo que le guste, aunque no esté de acuerdo con otra cosa. Por lo general, se quedan con algo. Es por eso que fue grato leer el artículo arriba citado, donde estos autores producen una elegante crítica de Jablonka y Lamb muy en sintonía con nuestra forma de pensar:

"However, while the authors dispute the gene-centered notion and consider evolution as a systemic multilayered phenomenon, we believe they fall short in one critical aspect: J&L rely heavily on the notion of “information transmission” in a rather loose manner. Their approach is liable to the argument that in order to have any such thing, one needs a transmitter, a message, and a receiver – something that is not easily found when dealing with biological phenomena"

"One influential hypothesis states that living systems are those that maintain organizational closure: they are constituted by networks of self-sustaining processes, regardless of the materials used to instantiate such loops; that is, they are autonomous systems (Maturana & Varela 1973; Varela 1979). When one understands organisms this way, the notion of information transmission becomes less appealing: a closed system cannot “have” information in itself"

El artículo de Hamame et al 2007 está en el grupoyahoo bajo el nombre "Précis of Evolution in Four Dimensions" Muy recomendado

martes, julio 08, 2008

NOTHING IN EVOLUTION MAKES SENSE BUT IN THE LIGHT OF BIOLOGY

Inverted Dobzhansky (in Chilean Andes)

This phrase was recently uttered at an evo-devo symposium by MQ Martindale. By turning Dobzhansky's dictum on its head, Martindale was referring to how the study of the development of marine invertebrates is crucial to reconstruct the evolutionary history of metazoa (1). However, this phrase can find unsuspected depths in its resonance, quite beyond the reconstruction of natural history. It reminds us of the big crime that was the elimination of developmental biology from the neodarwinian synthesis (buried in the name of population genetics).
In fact, the actual priority that should be given to organismal biology, including development, continues to evade much mainstream evolutionary biology, which continues to show too much adaptationist-reduccionist nonsense as a result of a doctrinary enthronization of population genetics.
Take the case of Richard Lewontin. He gets close to the truth on many counts but does not acknowledge the centrality of having a theory of organism. Without this, placing the focus on population genetics (his field) will always be misleading: the organism is collapsed between the gene level and the population level. In other words, to get a correct view of evolution Lewontin would have to renounce to population genetics as the basic framework and thus be willing to erase the blackboard for a new starting point. Notice that by erasing the blackboard I do not mean to destroy the achievements of population genetics, denying any of its utility for answering specific questions. It is merely not to consider it as starting point of all evolutionary understanding.
In fact, biology is a larger topic than population genetics, even larger than evolution itself. Yet the absence of a generally accepted theory of organism has led to confuse the branch with the root: thus the vaccum at the roots is not properly acknowledged.
This, however, did not happen to Humberto Maturana upon being asked by a medicine student "what happened at the origin of life, such that we can say that life began?". Suddenly realizing he did not have a theory of organism, Maturana blushed and was only capable of promising the student he would think it over and answer his question next year.
The result, as many chilean and brazilian biologists already know, was the theory of autopoiesis, a theory of the basic organization of the living. A systems perpective providing minimal theoretical terms for understanding exactly what is goig on in organisms, such that they exhibit the properties we observe. This is not a definiton made for evolutionary biology; it is a definition for life, and as such, universal to all biology. This is why the notion of auotopoiesis has proven fruitful in the theoretical discussion of fields of biology that would appear completely dispar, for instance, the study of abiogenesis; inmunology; and neurobiology (not to mention a somewhat distorted use of the term that has become very popular in the social sciences).
And it so happens that the systems perspective of autopoiesis, focused on the organism, has implications for the understanding of evolution, too...

(1): Like myself, Martindale proposes a ctenophore-like ancestor of bilateria: See Vargas and Aboitiz 2005.

lunes, julio 07, 2008

¿Qué es una adaptación?

Desde la perspectiva seleccionista, una adaptación es un rasgo que confiere una ventaja selectiva, es decir, algo que tiende a imponerse en la población. Un problema evidente de esta definición es que existen muchas adaptaciones que evidentemente no confieren ninguna ventaja competitiva, ya que estan presentes en todos los miembros de una población, por ejemplo, los ojos.

Desde una perspectiva sistémica, podría argumentarse que un rasgo adpatativo es un rasgo cuya modificación tiene el efecto de que el sistema pierde su organizacion y las propiedades que resultan de esta (generalmente, la desintegración de un ser vivo). Sacamos una parte de la máquina; si sigue funcionando, no era una adaptación, sino un rasgo neutro. Un rasgo estructural concreto, pero de ninguna relevancia sistémica inmediata.

El darwinista reclamará que esta perspectiva no incluye la reproducción: por ejemplo, si le corto un cuerno a un ciervo, puede argumentarse que éste tendrá menor "éxito reproductivo", pero no se morirá. Ya que el ciervo aún conserva su autopoiesis tras perder sus cuernos, ¿podemos afirmar que los cuernos no son una adaptación?

En este punto es interesante priorizar a la autopoiesis sobre la reproducción como condición de lo viviente. La noción sistémica de adaptación no contempla la reproducción. Hay buenos argumentos teóricos y empíricos para justificar esta exclusión. De partida, pese a tener cuernos muchos ciervos no se reproducen, y en muchos agregados sociales de organismos (partiendo por la comunidad celular que consitituyen nuestros cuerpos) se diferencian linajes que no son capaces de reproducirse: en tanto se reúnan las condiciones para que se repita un fenotipo que no se reproduce, este fenotipo se continuará repitiendo y podrá constituir un linaje.

El hacer estas distinciones no implica desconocer el hecho de que los organismos generalmente se generan por algún tipo de reproducción en vez de abiogénesis (nótese que la autoreproducción no es un requisito: puede ser aloreproducción, también). Lo que sucede es que la adaptación se constata a un nivel organísmico más básico. La constitución de un linaje es un fenómeno diferente, que requiere de la previa conservación de la adaptación. Quizás es legítimo decir que para la constitución de un linaje, la reproduccion es una condición adicional. Pero no lo es para constatar la adaptación. ¿Es esta la distinción apropiada? ¿Es necesario agregar algo más?

Nótese que según la noción sistémica, en la constitución de un nuevo linaje, la adaptación se conserva, pero no puede decirse de ninguna manera significativa que la adaptación aumenta. La noción de Fisher, de que un aumento de la adaptación es un requisito para que ocurra evolucion, no reviste ninguna utilidad científica.

viernes, mayo 16, 2008

Conditions of Evolution and Adaptation in Organisms as Autopoietic Systems




Del capítulo de Gerhard Roth en el libro "Environmental Adaptation and Evolution". El artículo entero pueden bajarlo desde los archivos del grupoyahoo de decenio (Roth1982) Provecho!

martes, marzo 25, 2008

Population genetics & game theory are not "The logic of life"

The theoretical disciplines of population genetics and game theory are upheld by neodarwinians as general explanatory frameworks for the study of evolution. These provide explanations that do not require understanding of development, physiology, and practically all mechanistic causation at an organismic level, even if these are acknowledged to be crucial. All organism-level mechanisms can be taken as simple "givens" imposed from the outside as from a completely mysterious black box.
This divorce and alienation of organismic biology from "evolutionary theory" was philosophically formalized by Ernst Mayr. To Mayr, any study at the organismic level, for instance of physiology, or developmental mechanisms, can only answer "how" questions of immediate mechanism; whereas evolutionary science is in charge of a different level of analysis of "why" questions and "ultimate" causation (by long-term selection, of course). Immediate mechanism apparently could be "whatever". Mayr then manages to make evolutionary science autonomous as a discipline....but only by means of turning its back on organismic biology.
The effect is disastrous. Neodarwinists have become addicted to attaching ad-hoc explanations to simply "given" organismal conditions, and destine all that level of causation to a wastepaper basket labeled "NON-evolutionary proximal mechanisms". Indeed the implication is that proximal mechanism is not an important part of properly "evolutionary" explanation. But then, if there is no general theory for biology, with no theoretical notions about all that biology that is going on at organismal level, how can a neodarwinist claim to have found a general framework for evolutionary biology? Indeed, is it even possible to have a general theory for evolution, without having a general theory for biology? A truly satisfactory evolutionary theoretical framework requires good theoretical grounds for handling the organismic level, rather than a philosophical argument to ignore it. Truth is, neodarwinists have no theory of organism.

That something is wrong with the "autonomy" of "evolutionary" science surfaces in many details. Consider, for instance, just how impervious the general frameworks of population genetics and game theory are to any data input from other fields of research, and specially so the more historical such as phylogenetic systematics. Consider, for instance, just how useless population genetics is to explain how reptilian jaw bones ended in the mammalian middle ear. The analogy in physics would perhaps be a theoretical physics-cosmology that won't take any lesson from astronomy and is not too helpful to explain any astronomical phenomenon.

In contrast, the systemic -historic perspective fully acknowledges and further emphasizes the historical nature of evolutionary explanations. Plus, we have the notion of autopoiesis for the theoretical handling of the organism level...

viernes, marzo 21, 2008

Varela y la "Teleología interna"

Estoy leyendo el trabajo de Weber y Varela (2002). El tipo de teleología que plantean es, como es de esperar, diferente al típico. Conserva la noción de propósito, pero no es un propósito "externo" como es el adaptacionismo que se intenta explicar con la teleonomía y selección natural, sino que se inspiran en un propósito interno intrínseco que dicen permite hablar de "propósitos naturales" en sistemas con auto-organización. Esto se inspira directamente en Kant : "A thing exists as a natural purpose if it is both cause and effect of itself". Como los sistemas autopoiéticos se auto-producen, estaría, pues, provistos de propósito "natural".

Esta perpectiva es comprensible, pero sospecho que continúa habiendo algo genuinamente erróneo en toda noción de propósito o final, con el ya mencionado potencial de "ceguera" que produce introducir una noción explicativa que pasa por alto los mecanismos.

La verdad es que ya en el 2000 cuando compré mi flamante copia de "El fenómeno de la vida" (que hoy se me cae a pedazos) me había quedado de ceño fruncido con este párrafo de Varela:

"La fuente de esta creacion-de-mundos es siempre un quiebre en la autopoiesis , sea menor como los cambios de concentración de un metabolizado, o mayor como la ruptura de los bordes. Debido a la naturaleza misma de la autopoiesis, -ilustrada por la reparación de la membrana en el ejemplo mínimo simulado más arriba- todo quiebre puede verse como el inicio de una acción, por parte del sistema sobre lo que falta, de manera que se mantenga la identidad. Repito: no hay una teleología implícita en este "de manera que": esto es lo que implica la lógica autorreferencial de la autopoiesis, en primer lugar. La acción se hará visible como un intento de modificar su mundo: cambio de lugar de diferentes nutrientes, aumento de la corriente de un metabolizado por síntesis metabólica, etc."

(Énfasis en cursiva lo puse yo.)

Aunque en esa ocasión Varela negó la teleología de la boca hacia afuera, creo que está claro que ya estaba pensando teleológicamente, lo que luego lo llevó a decidir asimilar el término, en vez de negarlo.

Pero tomemos el ejemplo mínimo de la ruptura y regeneración de la membrana celular. La descripción de Varela me parece que no aplica correctamente la noción sistémica de adaptación.

Si se produjera un auténtico quiebre de la autopoiesis, el sistema se desintegraría. La pérdida de un trozo de menbrana y su posterior regeneración no representa una interacción destructiva, con pérdida de la organización autopoiética, sino que corresponde a una perturbación. La clave: La mebrana no regenera "de manera que" se mantenga la identidad, o con el "propósito" de conservar la autopoiesis; más bien, la membrana regenera como consecuencia de que la autopoiesis aún existe, no se ha interrumpido y las relaciones productivas distribuidas, propias de la autopoiesis, rápidamente regeneran la membrana. Si el trozo de mebrana perdido fuera lo suficientemente grande, la organización autopoiética resulta desarticulada y tenemos que el ser vivo sencillamente se desintegra.

El hecho de que cualquier fenómeno con clausura operacional pueda describirse como a la vez causa y efecto de sí mismo no consituye una verdadera violación del orden cósmico de causalidad temporal.
Lo que ocurre en un ser vivo no ocurre con el propósito de conservar la autopoiesis, así como tampoco ocurre con el propósito de pasar los genes a la generación siguiente (la teleonomía de Monod).

Ref:

Varela, F. 2000. El fenómeno de la vida. Dolmen Ediciones

Weber A y Varela F. 2002. Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97–125.

miércoles, marzo 19, 2008

Autopoiesis, acoplamiento estructural y cognición.

Artículo de Humberto Maturana, publicado en el instituto matríztico, donde revisa la historia de estas y otras nociones y que se puede bajar desde aquí

domingo, marzo 16, 2008

Systemic vitalism, or the distinction of teleonomy from teleology

The concept of "vitalism" has been traditionally associated to pseudoscience, a metaphysical concept away from any empirisism. It is often referred to as the action of a "vital force" or "entelechy" proper to organic matter, that governs and directs living processes. However, Ortega y Gasset (see the post below) defines vitalism as "any biological theory that considers organic phenomena irreductible to physico-chemical principles" and states that it can be conceived from two radically different points of view: a) the assumption of a special form of entelechy or "vital force" distinct from physicochemical forces, or b) a rigurous empiric approach to study vital phenomena in the feral peculiarity they manifest, without assuming any mysticism, but avoiding a dramatic reduction to its physical properties.

In light of this distinction it is worthwhile to recall some concepts such as "emergence", a core notion of complex systems. "Emergent properties" are not properties of any component of the system, but of the system as a whole. Examples vary from "hurricanes" to "swarm intelligence" and "consciousness". As opossed to pseudoscientific vitalism, emergence is not restricted to organic matter, but is proper to systems.

Teleonomy is a term coined for the "apparent purposefulness" of living processes, as contrasted from "teleology", a concept that indicates intention of an external agent. We may well accept the distinction, although it is a common vice in scientist to confuse them, but an important question still remains: what is the biological process that lets us, as observers, to recall teleonomy?

Ernst Mayr (1965) have said: "It would seem useful to rigidly restrict the term teleonomic to systems operating on the basis of a program of coded information", but do we need to recall "information" to explain "apparent purposefulness"? It seems to me that to invoke "coded information" is as finalist as invoking an entelechy's "intention", so it would not be an acceptable biological answer.

It seems that our mechanicist tradition has forced us to reduce causes to the physico-chemical conformation, rather than to the organization. This reductionism has not only been uncapable of explaining biological phenomena, but has kept biologists in an Aristotelian "formal cause" reasoning, where genetic information is the entelechy able to determine the parts and relationships within organisms, thereby equating the metaphysical and organisational forms of vitalism.

A systemic answer to the "apparent purposefulness" dilemma can be envisioned by recalling the ontogenic phenotype/ontogenic niche relationship (the particular manner of living of an organism of a certain lineage). So when an investigator is observing an organism she recognizes a particular behaviour and can visualize a response for a given situation: she is bringing forth an operational congruence (adaptation) of the organism with its niche, that although pertains to the virtual domain of her observations, would seem to respond to an "apparent purposefulness". However, the organism is free to display behaviours distinct from those expected by the observed, as long as it maintains its adaptation, so the "apparent purposefulness" is only an observational artifact proper to the mind of the investigator accostumed to observe configurations.

Rodrigo Suárez

viernes, septiembre 07, 2007

A system, not a replicator. Autopoiesis vs Natural Selection at the origin and definition of life

The topic of the origin of life and the possibility of artificial synthesis of life in the lab shows SOME signs of catching up with conceptual advances defended in the 70's by Maturana and Varela.As reported by science journalist Carl Zimmer, Carol Cleland, a philosopher, is working at NASA on this topic.

"When people try to define life, they choose a few of the features of living things and make them the very essence of life. And that, Cleland and Chyba argue, is a mistake. "We don't want to know what the word life means to us. We want to know what life is," says Cleland"

This is the same way Maturana and Varela introduced the problem 34 years ago. They rejected definitions of life that were merely empirical-descriptive lists such as homeostasis, reproduction, and DNA. They emphasized that the search must be to identify the process itself from which these properties emerge; More than a description, a "theory of life" is needed. Cleland provides a good example to illustrate this point:

"In this sense, scientists who try to define life today make the same mistake that alchemists did in the Middle Ages. Alchemists tried to define substances by their properties, without any understanding of the underlying chemistry. Water, for example, was defined according to its ability to dissolve different solids. This definition led alchemists into confusion. Since ice couldn't dissolve anything, it couldn't be water. Alchemists gave the name "water" to things that we know now are nothing of the sort. They called nitric acid aqua fortis, or strong water, because it could dissolve most metals. Aqua regia, or noble water, was actually a mixture of hydrochloric acid and nitric acid that was powerful enough to dissolve even gold and platinum, the so-called noble metals. Searching for a better definition of water would have not gotten alchemists out of this mire. A solution only came in the 18th century, as scientists formulated a theory of chemistry. The behavior of water and other substances suddenly makes a lot of sense when you realize that they are all composed of atoms, which are in turn composed of smaller particles. Chemists can now say water is H2O. However, "'Water is H2O' isn't a definition," says Cleland. "It's a discovery."

However, Cleland then takes a wrong turn; she proposes that a defintion of life is impossible. I agree that in absence of a theory of life, defining life is nothing but a "barbaric" description. But once we DO have a theory of life, definitions should not only become possible, but they may allow an "acid test" for the clarity of the theory. Cleland's posture seems a bit mysterianist to me, as if no true theory of life will ever be possible. For instance, without a theory of life, how can we know if "having DNA" is or not directly related to life? Cleland certainly does not think that genes are crucial:

"Cleland, for example, doubts that Darwinian evolution, the core of the NASA definition of life, is essential. "I think those arguments are weak," she says. She envisions alien microbes filled with enzymes but lacking genes. The enzymes build more enzymes and the microbes split in two. They couldn't evolve through Darwinian evolution, because they wouldn't have genes. But they might still change, as their environment changed. Cleland doesn't claim any evidence that such things exist, but she argues that scientists can't rule them out"

Cleland's problem is that she does not have any truly sound THEORETICAL response if she were required to explain why she thinks DNA is unnecessary. We know already that many scientists would refuse to acknowledge such extraterrestrial things as truly alive; we cannot naïvely hope that the discovery of such extraterrestrial life would provide an empirical shortcut to "eliminating DNA" on what is truly a conceptual, and not an empirical, problem. After all, they can reply right back to Cleland that she cannot rule out the future discovery in other planets of autocatalytic self-replicating molecular "genes". Would she say those cannot be life? Why, exactly?

Because Maturana and Varela's autopoiesis is a systemic theory of life, it has no requirement for the presence of any particular type of molecule such as DNA; therefore, this theory explains why having DNA is not a requisite. According to Maturana and Varela's theory of organisms as "Autopoietic machines":

"An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a system of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components networked in a way such that: (i) through their continuous interactions and transformations they generate the processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute the machine as a concrete unit in physical space"

They emphasize that the production of components and the borders of this well-defined topological unit help produce each other: a distributed network. It is a little system; not a "selfish" self-replicator. Importantly, reproduction is not a requisite of the definition (yes, you can be a mule and still be autopoietic). Reproduction can occur as a RESULT of the growth and fracture of a previously existing autopoietic system; Maturana and Varela point out that many things can reproduce that are not autopoietic systems nor universally acknowledged as living (for instance, crystals, viruses, and prions).
The exclusion of reproduction from the core of the theroy of life is a pretty conspicuous difference from the "darwinian" perspective on the origin of life; according to those theories, the first life forms were self-replicating, reproducing molecules (RNA is a clear favorite), "genes" in themselves. This would put in motion a darwinian process of natural selection of favorable mutations, that therefater would have added DNA, membrane, proteins, etc. To ensure better self-replication, of course.
Now, as final words, allow me to indulge in some biochemical speculation (despite this not being my area). I dare say that it is becoming increasingly clear that no molecule of RNA complex enough to self-replicate can be produced without some vesicle or "border" separating it from the outer environment; nowadays most researchers seem to be trying to fit one biochemical cocktail or another into some kind of membrane or miscela of some kind. It seems probable to me that the new more impressive claims of "synthetic life" in the future will involve such little systems. Probably nothing too impresive will be coming from any isolated self-replicators....

-A. Vargas

Ref:
Maturana, Humberto & Varela, Francisco ([1st edition 1973] 1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of the Living. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (Eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 42. Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.